Are Moral Judgments Objective or Subjective: A Transcendental Defense of Objectivity


  • Prof. Franziska Weber Institute for Hermeneutics, Vienna University, Austria Author


Moral objectivity, Subjectivism, Transcendental philosophy, Ethical realism, Kantian ethics


The debate over the objectivity or subjectivity of moral judgments has persisted for centuries, engaging philosophers, ethicists, and scholars from diverse disciplines. This scholarly article aims to explore and defend the objective nature of moral judgments through a transcendental lens. Drawing upon Kantian transcendental philosophy and contemporary moral theory, this paper synthesizes arguments to support the objectivity of moral judgments, addressing challenges posed by subjectivist perspectives. Utilizing a multidimensional approach, the article discusses the nature of objectivity in moral judgments, navigates through relevant philosophical concepts, and critically evaluates objections to an objective stance.